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THE EFFECT OF A DECREE OF CONFIRMA-
TION UNDER THE CALIFORNIA IRRIGATION
DISTRICT LAW.
To promote the reclamation of the vast areas of arid lands
within its territorial jurisdiction, the Legislature of California,
on the 7th day of March, 1887, passed an Act entitled, "An Act
to provide for the organization and government of irrigation dis-
tricts and to, provide for the acquisition of water and other
property, and for the distribution of water thereby for irrigation
purposes" (Cal. Stats. 1887, p. 29). This actwill be hereinafter
called the "Wright Act." The irrigation districts organized
under this I w having experienced no small difficulty in effect-
ing the loans necessary to enable them to construct their pro-
posed systems of reservoirs, canals and ditches, the Legislature
of the State came to their assistance with the supplementary Act
of March 36, 1889, commonly called the "Confirmation Act"
(Cal. Stats. 1889, p. 2x2). This act provided in substance that
the board of directors of any irrigation district organized under
and in pursuance of the Wright Act might commence and prose-
cute in the courts of the state a special proceeding for the judi-
cial determination of all proceedings of the district and of its
board of directors by which the validity of the issue and sale of
district bonds might-be effected. The confirmation proceedings
were authorized to be maintained either before or after the nego-
tiation of a sale of the bonds. The manner in which jurisdiction
should be acquired and exercised in such proceedings was pre-
scribed in detail. Ample opportunity was afforded to all persons
interested to appear and contest the petitionl of the board of direc-
tors. The purpose of the Confirmation Act is well stated in the
opinion of the Supreme Court of California rendered in the
case of the Board of Directors of Modesto Irrigation District v.
Tregea, 88 Cal. 334, 338, as follows:
"As the validity of the bonds when issued depends upon the
regularity of the proceedings of the board, and upon the ratifi-
cation of the proposition by a majority of the electors, it is mat-
ter of common knowledge that investors have been unwilling to
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take them at their par value while all the facts affecting their
validity remain the subject of question and dispute."
"To meet this inconvenience-for the security of investors,
and to enable the irrigation districts to dispose of their bonds on
advantageous terms-the Supplemental Act, under which this
proceeding Was instituted, was passed."
All the legislation relating to the formation of irrigation dis-
tricts, and to their powers and functions, was revised and con-
solidated in 1897 (Cal. Stats. x897, p. 254). In Sections 68-
73 of this act provision is made for confirmation proceedings
similar to those authorized by the old Confirmation Act.
The importance of these and similar legislative attempts to
provide for the systematic reclamation by public authority of
the arid lands lying in the western and southwestern parts of
the United States is not easy of estimation. The constitution-
ality of the Wright Act in its principal provisions was fully sus-
tained in Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley et al., 164 U.
S. ii2. But the constitutionality of the Confirmation Act and
the effect of the decrees of the state courts confirming or refus-
ing to confirm the proceedings of the irrigation districts leading-
to the issue and sale of bonds are, it must be conceded, still the
cause of very distressing anxiety to the owners of securities of
the irrigation districts; and, to the irrigation districts themselves,
the occasion of no slight financial embarrassment. This unfor-
tunate state of affairs-unfortunate alike for the investors in
district bonds and the owners of irrigable lands-is largely
attributable to what, it is submitted, is a serious misapprehen-
sion of the import of the opinion which the Supreme Court of
the United States rendered November i6, 1896, in the case of
Tregea v. Modesto Irrigation District, 164 U. S. 179. The
misapprehension appears to be based in part upon the respect
with which the opinions of that high tribunal are deservedly
received, but in far greater part- upon a failure to apply the princi-
ples of constitutional law in the light of which this particular
opinion ought to be read.
It is proposed therefore to examine, somewhat minutely, the
legal principles determining what effect, in the present state of
the authorities, should be given to a decree of the state courts
confirming and approving the proceedings leading to an issue
of bonds by irrigation districts organized under the provisions
of the Wright Act.
There is no need of argument to show that, in determining
this matter, it is the duty of all courts, whether state or federal,
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to be controlled by the supreme law of the land as defined in the
second paragraph of Article VI. of the Constitution of the
United States:
"This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which
shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every
state shall be bound thereby; anything in the constitution or
laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding."
But, subject only to the express and implied limitations and
restrictions imposed upon the political power of the states by
the supreme law of the land as defined in the Constitution of the
United States, each state is possessed of supreme, uncontrollable
political authority within its territorial limits. In other words,
each state, within its territorial jurisdiction, and within the
sphere of its political authority, is sovereign (Tarble's Case, 13
Wallace, 397, 406; Ableman v. Booth, 21 Howard, 506).
In the people of each state inheres the legal right to establish
their own constitution of government, provided that in so doing
they neither invade the sphere of the nation's sovereignty, nor
otherwise come in conflict with the supreme law of the land.
The people of the State of California have, by their constitution,
created a legislature with power to enact laws for their govern-
ment within the sphere of the state's sovereignty, and, within
that sphere, possessed of powers limited only by the provisions
of the state constitution. The people of the State of California
have also, by their constitution, created a judiciary with power
to hear and finally to determine all controversies of a judicial
nature arising under their constitution and laws, and not within
the jurisdiction of the federal courts. And, as has been so well
said by the late Hon. Thomas M. Cooley, "the same reasons
which require that the final decision upon all questions of
national jurisdiction should be left to the national courts, will
also hold the national courts bound to respect the decisions of
the state courts upon all questions arising under the state con-
stitution and laws, where nothing is involved of national
authority, or of right under the Constitution, laws or treaties of
the United States; and to accept the state decisions as correct,
and to follow them whenever the same questions arise in the
national courts" (Const. Lim. 6th ed., pp. 20, 21).
Among the matters, with respect to which the judgment of
the highest state tribunal is conclusive and binding,' not only
upon the inferior cotarts of the State, but even upon the Supreme
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Court of the United States, the construction of the state consti-
tution and of the acts of the state legislature stands foremost.
It is the established doctrine of the Supreme Court of the
United States that it will adopt and follow the decisions of the
state courts in the construction of their own constitutions and
statutes, when that construction has been settled by the decisions
of the highest tribunal of the state, whatever may be the opinion
entertained by it of the original soundness of such construction.
To this doctrine some exceptions have been recognized; such
exceptions, for the most part, having been designed to protect
the substantial rights of citizens who, in reliance upon decisions
of the state courts, have entered into contracts or acquired
property only to find the earlier decisions soon overruled by the
same court by which they were pronounced. None of the ex-
ceptions have to do with cases where the construction of the
state constitution or statutes by the state courts has been uni-
form (Morley v. L. S. & M. S. Ry.. Co., J46 U. S. 162; Aberdeen
Bank v. Chehalis County, 166 U. S. 440; Fairfield v. County of
Gallatin, 100 U. S. 47; Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20, 33-4).
In Fairfield v. County of Gallatin, supra, it appears that the
Supreme Court of the United States had previously placed a
construction upon a provision of the constitution of the State of
Illinois in ignorance of the fact that the supreme court of that
state had theretofore construed it in a different manner. Yet,
in that case, the United States Supreme Court thought itself in
duty bound to follow the state court and to adopt as the true
construction of the state constitution that which the state court
had declared.
The construction, therefore, of a state constitution or
statute does not present a federal question, at all events unless
the state court of last resort has at different times in constru-
ing such constitution or statute, rendered inconsistent and con-
flicting decisions. Nor does a conflict between an act of a state
legislature and the state constitution ordinarily give rise to a
federal question. But whether or not a state constitution or
statute, as construed by the state court of last resort, is in con-
flict with the supreme law of the land, is a question to be finally
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.
It has been contended that the operation of the California
irrigation district law including the Confirmation Act, is to de-
prive property owners residing within irrigation districts of
property without due process of law. But, since the decision of
the case of Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley, suplra, this
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contention is obviously without merit, unless it be considered
that the confirmation proceedings, which are designed to result.
eventually in deprivation of property, do not constitute due pro-
cess of law upon the ground that the Confirmation Act imposes
upon the courts of the state other than judicial duties in viola-
tion of the state constitution.
At this point let us take up the case of Tregea v. Modesto
Irrigation District, supra. It does not appear from the pub-
lished reports of this case whether or not there were brought to
the notice of the court any of the California cases construing the
Confirmation Act, except Board of Directors of the Modesto Irri-
gation District v. Tregea, seipra. At all events, the Supreme
Court construed the act and considered the nature of the pro.
ceedings as if these matters were yet open. Assuming that the
construction of the Confirmation Act is as yet undetermined by
the Supreme Court of California the opinion of the Supreme
Court of the United States in Tregea v. Modesto Irrigation Dis-
trict, supra, is entitled to great weight in any attempt to deter-
mine the meaning of the Confirmation Act. It is important,
therefore, to ascertain exactly what was determined by that
court, and upon what consideration its determination was based.
In that case, it is submitted, one point, and one point only, was
decided, viz., that the Supreme Court of the United States could
not acquire or exercise jurisdiction of the special proceedings
authorized by the Confirmation Act. This decision was based
entirely upon the ground that such confirmation proceedings do
not constitute "a, case or controversy with opposing parties,
such as can be submitted to or compel judicial consideration or
judgment." Notwithstanding the fact that three Justices dis-
sented from the opinion of the majority of their brethren, the
decision appears, to the present writer at least, to be in perfect
harmony.with settled principles. Upon the ground set forth
above the federal courts will be forever precluded from taking
jurisdiction of proceedings instituted under the Confirmation Act.
In ruling thus, however, the Supreme Court plainly con-
sidered the matter solely in the light of Article III. of the Con-
stitution of the United States which defines the powers of the
federal judiciary. For the Supreme Court is careful to say that
it is "not concerned with any question as to what a state may
require of its judges and courts, nor with what measures it may
adopt for securing evidence of the regularity of the proceedings
of its municipal corporations." Ana this is a most important
distinction as will be'observed upon an examination of the case.
of Forsyth v. Hammond; x66 U. S. 5o6.
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From the report of the last-mentioned case, it appears that
the City of Hammond had instituted proceedings in one of the
courts of Indiana, and had obtained a decree of that court annex-
ing to the city certain lands belonging to Forsyth and others.
Forsyth appealed from that decree; and, before the Supreme
Court of Indiana, contended that the decree in the lower court
was null and void as having been rendered without jurisdiction.
The ground upon which this contention was made was that the
proceedings for ainexation of territory to the municipality were
legislative, and not judicial, in their nature; or, to use the
language of Mr. Justice Brewer in the case of Tregea v. Modesto
Irrigation District, supra, did not constitute "a case or contro-
versy with opposing parties, such as can be submitted to and
can compel judicial consideration and judgment." The state
supreme court decided in favor of the jurisdiction. Subse-
quently, Forsyth filed a bill in the Circuit Court of the United
States for the District of Indiana, against the City of Hammond
and others, to restrain the collection of certain taxes which had
been levied upon her land annexed to the city as already men-
tioned. Her bill set forth the proceedings leading to the annexa-
tion of her lands to the city, "but averred that those proceed-
ings were void because the enlargement of the limits of the city
was a matter of legislative and not of judicial cognizance, and
that it was not competent for the Legislature to intrust to the
courts, the decision of such questions." The Circuit Court dis-
missed the bill; but its judgment was reversed by the Circuit
Court of Appeals which ruled in accordance with the conten-
tions of plaintiff Forsyth. The Supreme Court of the United
States reversed the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals upon
the ground "that the construction, by the courts of a state, of its
constitution and statutes, is, as a general rule, binding on the
federal courts," even though they think that the state court has
misconstrued such constitution and statutes.
Upon the principles declared in Forsyth v. Hammond, supra,
it is the duty of the inferior courts of California to give effect to
a decree of confirmation duly given and made in pursuance of
the Confirmation Act, in accordance with the decisions of the
state supreme court; and it is equally the duty of the "federal
courts, whenever such a confirmation decree shall be pleaded or
introduced in evidence in causes of which they have jurisdiction,
to follow the state decisions. If, as the fact is, the California
Supreme Court has decided that confirmation proceedings are so
far judicial in their nature as to be capable of being submitted
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to and of compelling judicial consideration and judgment in the
state courts, the further question whether such proceedings are
to be considered as operating in rent or in personam is also one
upon which its decision is conclusive (Wood v. Brady, 15o U. S.
18, 23).
A consideration of the points thus far advanced will show
that the original question has been narrowed to this, What con-
struction and effect has the Supreme Court of the State of Cali-
fornia given to the Confirmation Act?
In the case of Cullen v. Glendora Water Company, 113 Cal.,
503, 511, 516, there was presented to the Supreme Court of the
State of California, for its determination the very question which
was passed upon by the Supreme Court of the United States in
the case of Tregea v. Modesto Irrigation District, supra, the
court stating the point as follows: "Counsel for appellant con-
tend that the Act of March 16, 1889, providing for a judicial ex-
amination, approval, and confirmation of bonds of irrigation
district, is unconstitutional for the reason that it authorizes a
court to hear and determine what will be the rights of parties
interested in those bonds, in advance of any controversy as to
such rights." The Supreme Court of California ruled against
this contention, and sustained the Confirmation Act as constitu-
tional just as the Supreme Court of Indiana had upheld the con-
stitutionality of the statute considered in the case of Forsyth v,.
Hammond, supra.
Not only has the constitutionality of the Confirmation Act
been upheld by the Supreme Court of this State, but the nature
and effect of the decree rendered in confirmation proceedings
have been judicially considered and determined. In the case of
Crall v. Poso Irrigation District, 87 Cal. 140, 146, it was de-
cided, (i) that the confirmation proceeding, denominated in the
act a special proceeding, is in the nature of a proceeding in rem,
the object being to determine the status of the district and its
power to issue valid bonds; and (2), that the judgments rendered
in confirmation proceedings are conclusive and binding upon all
the world until reversed on appeal, or set aside by some direct
proceeding instituted for that purpose. Upon the authority of
Crall v. Poso Irrigation District, supra, the Supreme Court of
this State decided the same questions in the same way in the
case of Rialto Irrigation District v. Brandon, 103 Cal. 384.
And the same construction is placed upon the Confirmation Act
in Cullen v. Glendora Water Company, supra, and in Modesto
Irrigation District v. Tregea, supra, which is the very case taken-
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up to the Supreme Court of the United States and there reported
as Tregea v. Modesto Irrigation District. Since the United
States Supreme Court dismissed the case of Tregea v. Modesto
Irrigation District, the Supreme Court of the State of California
has exercised jurisdiction upon appeal from a decree by the Supe-
rior Court of Colusa County confirming proceedings resulting in
the organization of the Central Irrigation District (in re Central
Irrigation District, 49 Pac. Rep. 354). In this case no intima-
tion is given of any change of mind on the part of the Supreme
Court of this State respecting the construction and effect of the
Confirmation Act.
It is to be observed that the Supreme Court of the United
States, in arriving at the conclusion that a decree by a state court
approving and confirming each and all of the proceedings for the
organization of an irrigation district under the provisions of the
Wright Act, from and including the petition for the organiza-
tion of the district, and of other proceedings which may affect
the legality and validity of the bonds of such district, and the
order for the sale, and the sale thereof, cannot be invoked as
resjudicata, appears to have considered as of great importance
that a decree refusing to confirm such proceedings would not be
conclusive in respect to negotiable paper as against purchasers
thereof without notice of the suit or decree. In that part of its
opinion devoted to this point, it is submitted, the Supreme Court
slightly misconceived the purpose and scope of the Confirmation
Act as determined by the courts of California. The purpose of
the Confirmation Act is to provide for a judicial examination
and determination of the "legality and validity of all the pro-
ceedings for the organization of irrigation districts, and all other
proceedings affecting the legality or validity of the bonds of
such district, including the order for the sale, and the sale of
such bonds." In other words, the purpose of the Act is to pro-
vide for the judicial determination of the status of the district
and of the regularity of its proceedings, and only indirectly to
establish the status or character of bonds as valid or invalid in
their inception (Crall v. Poso Irrigation District, 87 Cal. 140,
146; in re Madera Irrigation District, 92 Cal. 296, 340).
A decree rendered, in conformity with the provisions of the
Confirmation Act, refusing to approve and confirm the proceed-
ings affecting the legality of bonds issued or to be issued, if
given the force of a judgment in rem, would merely establish
the fact or facts, from which the necessary inference would be
that the bonds of the district were invalid in their inception.
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Proof of such an adjudication would merely put upon the owner
of bonds the burden of proving that he was a bona fide purchaser
for value, in the ordinary course of business, before maturity
(Eames v. Crosier, ioi Cal. 216; Stewart v. Lansing, 104 U. S.
5o5). The rights of holders of irrigation district bonds proved
by such an adjudication to be invalid in their inception do not
appear to have been passed upon yet by the courts. Causes
involving such rights, when they arise, will undoubtedly be
decided upon the facts peculiar to each case, in accordance with
the usual rules which determine the liability of municipal cor-
porations on securities issued by them.
Wm. Bradford Bosley.
SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., November 29, 1897.
